(re)thought: The Political Transparency of Space

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Is there a mental process of thinking about space that is embraced by those in power that informs architects through cultural, social, and economic forces as an expression in architectural space? If the answer is yes, is it possible that the resultant architecture transparently interpellates or transforms individuals into subjects who are in perfect agreement with those in power? Understanding this notion is imperative today with the current debates on privacy and its relationship to, such diverse topics as security, Guantánamo Bay, or gated communities. Certainly, architects have throughout time consistently conceptualized new spaces that have transcended their predecessor's narrow views and in many cases aligned itself with emerging political and social change. For example, classical space was comprised of serialized, hierarchical, and compartmentalized spaces which mirrored the monarchy but was challenged and superseded by modernist spaces that used the free plan to closely follow progressive class evolution and liberty. The idea that there is a link between space and a political state is clear. I speculate that there is a less obvious ideological model where a certain type of thinking about space-making is concealed within the architectural process itself. Do architects engage with it but, like ideology itself, their processes remain transparent to them? Architects, such as Brunelleschi, Walter Gropius, Le Corbusier, Louis I. Kahn, Morphosis and Frank Gehry (to name only a few) have created new designs, embraced new technologies, and utilized new materials that indicate architecture's ability to inspire individuals. But despite these innovative tactics, architects struggle with the sense that architecture has "the predominate taste for authority, whether human or divine."[1] If by authority one means the organization of people by cultural, political, economic, and policing practices means than it is difficult to know accurately if power is being asserted in oppressive or congenial ways. This is why recent scholars on power, such as Devoy and Findley agree that architects must be continually on the defensive against the possibility of being abused by those in power.

This paper explores theories of space and power under the rubric of Gilles Deleuze, who claims that thinking-spatially artificially fixes events and one's identity in time.[2] I posit the notion that those in power have dominated a model of spatial-thinking. To demonstrate this position I look toward the Parthenon which stands as the emblematic symbol of architecture to see if the model of spatial thinking, that I suspect is problematic, begins there. I will explore the link between ideology and how a subject is formulated in the work Henri Lefebvre; explain the antithesis of spatial-thinking which is non-spatial thinking through Deleuze's work.

Many architectural critics, such as Markus, Devoy, and Findley, describe the tentative or oppressive nature those in power have over architecture and suggest that architects must use their creativity to surmount it. Kim Dovey explains that the "nexus of built form with power is, at one level, a tautological truth" because buildings and their environment are determined—"programmed, designed and built"—by those who have power.[3] But he says that architecture is not "inherently oppressive".[4] The paradox that architecture is both in league with power while not really that oppressive is the basis for this investigation. Why do important critics, such as Dovey,

see architecture not as an independent art form but rather in battle with some internal aspect imposed on it by those in power? Doevy argues that an architect's "creative spirit," what Plato called the "demiurge,"[5] must be separated from the universal principles which have their beginning in "Plato's Ideal forms and authoritarian politics."[6] I agree that the architect's creativity is equal to the ideals of freedom and liberty but I disagree that the demiurge is the model to usurp universal authority because, in Plato's definition, it is the authority of the "creator" who makes the chaotic world into a form that is the Ideal. Simon Richards explains that Plato believed that all humans were capricious and with a tendency to be extravagant. Richards quotes Plato who wrote that the first thing that artists must do is "wipe the slate of human society and human habits clean".[7] But Plato is referring to "philosophic artists" and not artistic artists. He explains the difference between philosophy artists and regular artists is that the former are "unwilling to start work on an individual or a city ... until they have a clean canvas."[8] This is consistent with Plato's view that artists, which includes architects, dwell in the world of the simulacrum which means they make copies of copies devoid of any real connection to the Ideal; in short they lie. Thomas Markus adds that the "creation of order which is the point of all architecture" is dependent on rules and systems that are "alienating and imprisoning." Markus agrees in principle with Dovey that architects must "adopt the creative resignation of the poet" to compensate for oppressive aspects of power.[9] Lisa Findley writes that architecture has been, "for most of its history," serving those in power and it "might be argued that it was *invented* by those in power."[10] She offers a slightly different conclusion than Markus and Dovey which is the idea that architects must assume the rubric of social change and empower their work by "re-imagining the ordinary aspects of architecture;" in other words, architects must be "imaginatively engaged" in work that fosters social change.[11] It is implied by Findley's argument that social change means to make things better but it is not clear in what manner. Findley and other critics' conclude that creativity equals good is admirable but it fails to account for the underlying agreement that most people shared with their respective cultural and political system. This agreement with one's culture is the fundamental problem with power.

SPACE AND THE PROBLEM OF POWER

Henri Lefebvre claims that spatial practices, for example, a literary space, an architectural space or leisure space, are created by the projection of all "aspects, elements, and moments of social practice" onto a spatial field. For him spatial practices are the production or the making of space *itself* for people, events, and objects to inhabit. Lefebvre agrees with Marx that society is subjugated by political power, specifically capitalist power. He draws the conclusion that an understanding of space, what he calls the "science of space," represents an understanding of the "political use of knowledge."[12] To make a viable civilization requires a complex conception of spatial practices; for example, spaces for courts, commerce, and education. And through their implementation a society exercises control over the people who inhabit those spaces.[13] Lefebvre's epistemological approach to a theory of space asks to what "extent may a space be read or decoded"? It is a complicated question to answer, Lefebvre argues, but a space that is produced by a society implies a signification network. But Lefebvre is not pursuing a formal analysis of a society's spatial code system; instead he wants to analyze the dialectical nature of the spatial practices. His spatial dialectics incorporates material and historical interactions to determine their relationship to those in power.[14] Marx wrote, "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness."[15] Lefebvre agrees with Marx's statement that the modes of production (i. e. labor, tools and machines, and buildings) and the relationship of these to the means of production (i. e. laws, property, and institutions) within a society prescribe how an individual thinks and behaves in that society; this is the form of power.[16] Kim Dovey suggests that this form of power intersect with an ontology of dwelling that is directly expressed in architecture.[17] For this to be true means that architectural space must take on object-like properties to become a figurative and discernable entity. Thus, the actual delineation of the space by such elements as, walls, materials, and structural elements support the object properties of the space itself in expressing a specific idea. In this model space becomes a "mode of production" and a "means of production." It is now a simple matter to see how power—as a mode of organization and reproduction of the state—is transferred from architectural space onto someone occupying the space.

Lefebvre explains this process in detail writing that a basic ontological sense of space is transferred to a person when one places themselves at the center of what they believe is now a social space. In doing so, one assumes the objectivity of the space to measure themselves against its principles. This comparison transforms them into a subject with a "specific social status–assuming always a stable situation, and hence determination by and in a *state*–implies a role and a function: an individual and a public identity."[18] A person in space, in particular architectural space, is "conceived as produced and as the production of a space: symmetries, interactions and reciprocal actions, axes, and planes, centres and peripheries, and concrete (spatio-temporal) oppositions."[19] The danger, Lefebvre warns, is that this space is "the locus of prohibition, for it is shot through with both prohibitions and their counterparts, prescriptions."[20]The analysis above suggests that a truly free individual is impossible because they are a product of social practices that are built into the spaces they inhabit. But how? In short, the ontology expressed by those in power resides within how one thinks about space *in-itself* and how one thinks about themselves. A critical eye, such as Dovey, Lefebvre, or Foucault, reveals that the most insidious aspect of architecture throughout history is its connection to power under the auspices of a paradigm of thinking spatially. But what does this really mean? Certainly this claim might initially sound aggressive because there are countless buildings that elevate both the human condition and an individual's spirit. But, let me clarify. Thinking spatially is not about extensional aspects of design, such as axis and paths, or programmatic uses, such as lobbies and galleries. Thinking spatially concerns the method by which architectural space can be designed and utilized to stabilize an individual's identity or way of *Being*. One's identity or "Being" is derived by a complex variety of forces, rules, and beliefs.[21] Lefebvre provides a basis for how any conception of space influences an individual. He writes,

> the bodies of 'users' – are caught up not only in the toils of parcellized space, but also in the web of what philosophers call 'analogons': images, signs, and symbols. These bodies are transposed out of themselves, transferred, and emptied out, as it were, via the eyes: every kind of appeal, incitement and seduction is mobilized to tempt them with doubles of themselves in prettified, smiling and happy poses; and this campaign to void them succeeds exactly to the degree that the images proposed correspond to 'needs' that those same images have helped fashion.[22]

Lefebvre is arguing against abstracting people by the terms and processes used by those who control cultural and economical institutions. Peopled are undermined by emptying them of any substantial content through their engagement in "parcellized space" that serves as a surrogate for the transfomative gaze of the state. Lefebvre provides two key elements pertinent to this investigation: first, "parcellized space" and the fact that "bodies are transposed out of themselves, transferred, and emptied out." In this scenario individuals are first imagined to possess a reoccurring essence that remains the same while moving between different spaces over time. Second, he argues that the belief in a fixed essence can be hollowed out or emptied and (re)programed with new information. The "campaign to void" individuals is successful, ironically, because many individual needs align with the things that are managed and produced by those in power.

THE MANNER IN WHICH IDEOLOGY MAKES ITSELF INVISIBLE TO INDIVIDUALS

The belief that control is exercised by those in power through space is tenable because buildings are ubiquitous and a great deal of our time is spent negotiating the details of our lives with the institutions occupying them. But this argument fails to explain why intelligent individuals cannot see how ideology actually determines their life. For example, in retrospect it is difficult to understand why normal Germans went along with Nazism. A key to making sense of this paradox resides in Kant's obsession with finding the "universal form (constitutive) of knowledge" that is shared by a society.[23] Slavoj Žižek explains that Kant posited the idea that ethics is based on the universality of *rule*s that measure and regulate our lives*.* Kant was concerned that objects are represented to us through our senses and we react to them based on whether it triggers pleasure or displeasure. Žižek explains Kant's concern that any determinations made by "our will is [...] always empirical, [and] linked to contingent circumstances." We must live with the fact that we are only finite beings limited by our "phenomenal, temporal-spatial experience." Our finite existence severely handicaps us because we lack access to the "thing-in-itself".[24] If we did have access to the "thing-in- itself" we would have total certainty about things. Not only would they know the Truth but truth and our self would be the same thing. Kant's goal, which I believe is shared by everyone,

is the desire to know the world as it really is. But is there anything within us that could transcend our contingent experiences that could help us? According to Žižek, if the truth of a thing cannot be found in the object nor does it reside in our activity, then we are only left with the "very form of this activity: the form of universal legislation, independent of its particular, contingent content."[25] Kant argued that this "universal form" is the form of Law. Laws are universal rules that everybody who is rational knows; in other words, if you are reasonable you act in manner that is like universal law, such as helping those in need, not committing suicide, not committing murder, and supporting the state. Basically, morally right actions stem from one's (good) motives that take on the universal form of Law that is right for everyone. The problem, Žižek warns, is that the Law has intrinsic attributes derived from those who agree with it, by those in power, and those subjugated to it. Žižek quotes Kant's response to anyone who might not agree writing the,

> origin of the supreme power, for all practical purposes, is not discoverable by the people who are subject to it. In other words the subject ought not to indulge in speculations about its origin … these are completely futile arguments for a people which is already subject to civil laws, and they constitute a menace to the state.[26]

Kant was unable to imagine that Laws stemming from reason might be harmful or oppressive to certain individuals of a society. Thus, any examination of them would be a purely self-interested (and not social) gesture. Is this not ideology at its most sublime?

Louis Althusser posited the most concise and poignant description of ideology which is the theory of "interpellation." This is the process by which a person recognizes themselves in the call of social institutions. For example, when a policeman yells at me to stop, I assume the social, political, and legal mandates that are behind his voice and stop. This simple act exposes the power that I am subjugated to while glossing over the fact that the call itself provides the content that I become. In other words, the identity or essence issued by the state is transparently mapped on top of me.[27] Althusser explains that ideology "represents the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence;" in other words, we do not represent the "real world" to ourselves but instead we represent the *relation* we have with our conditions

of existence. The relations are imaginary because they are mediated and constructed through our symbolic network before they become expressed in institutions, such as schools, religion, governments.[28] Althusser argues that the representations used to signify, identify, and justify the social fabric are distinct and radically different than how things really are. He explains the deadlock:

> ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: *individuals are always-already subjects*.[29]

What this amounts to is the notion that individuals are "abstracted" into being subjects by such mandates as student, architect, laborer, or such phrases as "you are a good person." The intent of the state in terms of society, modes of production, culture, and justice is to reproduce all of the conditions that will allow the state to be (re)produced forever. It is now possible to apply Lefebvre, Žižek, and Althusser's theories of ideology directly to architectural space with the supposition that space "intepellates" individuals as "always-already" subjects. In my opinion we have a perfect model as to how this is being done which is the Parthenon.

THE PARADIGM OF THE PARTHENON

It can be safely said that the Parthenon captivates our imagination because it is perceived as the paradigmatic symbol of civilization and architecture. Its enduring fascination suggests that it might also hold a clue to an ontology created by the relationship between power and architecture. The spatial composition and function of the Parthenon affects the citizens of Athens in many ways. A partial list of the most crucial affectations are; philosophical, such as establishing order from chaos, maintaining stability, differentiating the positive aspect of being human; political, such as expressing the structure of justice, hierarchy of a ruling class, defining the role of the state; and creative, such as the expression of individual and social aspirations, defining the human condition, and providing social criticism. The Parthenon is thought by many to be a symbol of human perfection in craft, reason, and order. Its ubiquitous spell is broadly cast thus we could speculate that if it had a process of transferring power onto individuals by abstracting them into subjects

it would be paradigmatic and, like ideology itself is invisible. What would the process used by the Greek state look like?

Those in power in the Greek state would ask their architects to create an architectural space to hold the image of a god that is equal to the inherent power of the god itself, in this Temple it is Athena Nike. To achieve this phenomenal accomplishment requires those in power to explain the attributes of the god, all of which are Ideal and abstract (Athena Nike is all knowing, powerful, benevolent, overseer of war, and so on). The god is always "absent," in the literal sense, because if she ever made an appearance it would mean that her abstract qualities would become accessible to earthly experience by becoming concrete; this would be a reversal to Kant's notion of truth being inaccessible to human experience. Nonetheless, Athena Nike is given "presence" by creating a statue in her likeness and designing an architectural space (the Parthenon) that is equal to her power. In other words, the space contains an Ideal subject who is never present but through her absence exercises control, in an Althusserian manner, over the priests, civilians, and politicians who visit the Temple.

By 1838 architects discovered that the Parthenon was constructed with "virtually no straight lines and no plumb surfaces" as a tactic to manipulate perception so that the Parthenon appears to be perfectly straight and level; it appears Ideal. The Parthenon is constructed in an impure manner so that its image would appear correct despite the distortion created by human vision. This discovery further elevated the status of the Parthenon because it was now seen as the merger of the two greatest aspects of humanity, poetry and reason.[30] Etlin explains that the fascination of making "order out of disorder" was celebrated by James Fergusson as "symmetrical in its parts but asymmetrical in the whole,"[31] and by Auguste Choisy who claims it had been "ordered: [by] dissymmetry and displacement of axes."[32] The consensus reached among engineers and architects, such as Fergusson, Choisy, and Viollet-le-Duc is that the Parthenon was deliberately distorted and that by using reason (which means scientifically) the architects controlled an individual's view, path, and spatial experience to achieve poetry (which is Ideal beauty). Choisy came to this conclusion by reconstructing and analyzing perspective drawings [figure 1].[33]


Figure 1

But the reason and poetry which Choisy and others imagined to have contributed to the creation of Parthenon is fragile because it can only be perceived from a unique and singular point-of-view. This view point would collect and reorganize the warped and angled building elements into an ideal image. Thus any deviation, such as stopping too late or being too far to the right destroys the *illusion* of perfection. It is improbable that the Acropolis was used by people walking in a single line and stopping at the precise point to "perceive" the perfected Parthenon. It is more likely that these principles were physically implemented and appropriated by belief and not experience or reason. This suggests that an individual could only assume the imaginary Ideal subject who could occupy the correct point at the correct time and see the Parthenon as it really was for them. In other words, an individual would "act" appropriately when approaching the Parthenon by assuming (or rather interpellating) the prescribed perception of the Ideal subject.

Both Le Corbusier and Louis I. Kahn sketched the Parthenon and their drawings and writings testify to a profound transformation in their thoughts on architecture [figures 2 and 3]. Louis I. Kahn wrote that the Parthenon "is highly inspiring as an expression of an institution of man."[34] But he turns his attention to the temple at Paestum to explain what is actually inspiring about the Parthenon. He writes:

> It is because from it the Parthenon came. Paestum is dumpy — it has unsure, scared proportions. But it is infinitely more beautiful to me because to me it represents the beginning of architecture. It is a time when the walls parted and the columns became and

when music entered architecture. It was a beautiful time and we are still living on it.[35]

Kahn sees the transition from Paestum to the Parthenon as the birth of architecture in itself. Further, he claims that for architects today there exists a little bit of the Parthenon, as the primordial birth of architecture, in all of subsequent works of architecture. If this is true then there must be something other than the "event" of going from the dumpy Paestum to the elegant Parthenon that is being replicated.


Figure 2

Le Corbusier was equally impressed by the Parthenon. Reflecting on his visit to the Parthenon he admits in, *Un Maison- Une Palais*, that he "accepted the fact that this place should be like a repository of a sacred standard, the basis for all measurement in art."[36] He was so enamored that it became the Ideal model with which to compare his beloved motorcar and his architecture. Le Corbusier believed that the Parthenon expresses a standardization that is emblematic of a universal process of organization which the car and his architecture strive.[37] He believed that the Acropolis and the Parthenon represented the "pinnacle of human creation,"[38] and that they attained the highest order of perfection because they are the "product of selection applied to an established standard; [and] a standard is necessary for order in human effort."[39] I take this to mean that Le Corbusier saw in the Parthenon the power to regulate a manner of living that is ordered, universal, and required. He was quite aware that the order derived from geometry in the Parthenon revealed power where "Priests


Figure 3

and tyrants, demonstrating their strength, established architecture on geometry."[40] In a sense, Le Corbusier aligned his architecture with Greek notions of civil life and philosophy. Simon Richards believes that Le Corbusier, like Plato, saw the world as inherently "evil, and sought to reform it in an orderly way."[41] Richards explains that Le Corbusier was disinterested in actual human beings whom a long time collaborator, Maxwell Fry confirmed: "I imagined that he peopled his buildings, where indeed they gave the impression of being peopled, by figments of his own creation".[42] The two salient positions derived from the Parthenon are as follows: 1) Kahn's way of seeing the Parthenon as the poetry that drove humans to make architecture in the first place. 2) Le Corbusier's way of seeing the Parthenon as the rule or spirit of order that humanity measures itself aganst.

The Parthenon is comprised of three layers of space: the colonnade, the interior colonnade, and the naos, which is the space for the statue of Athena Nike.[43] The separation of the temple into spatial layers is crucial, as Sophia Psarra explains, because the layered spaces mark the "categorical distinction of the religious space from the human domain."[44] Although they were separated, "gods and humans... communicated and met through axiality and geometrical order."[45] Individuals in the temple were literally placed into discreet and measured spaces that mirrored both their social role and their purpose at the temple. However, the main intent of the temple was to establish an ordered, fixed and determinable space for the god Athena Nike in the middle of the chaotic earthly world. Subsequently, this spatial intent established the Athenian social and political order itself.

Figure 4

The statue of Athena Nike is an ideal and perfect entity because it is facilitated by the god Athena Nike. Although it is imagined that she occupied the temple everyone understood that her attributes are represented by the statue [see figure 4]. Nonetheless, the priests and citizens of Athens maintained their belief that the statue they imagined and created *embodied* Athena Nike. But, in reality, they knew that she is never present. The spaces that comprise the temple use a myriad of carved narratives to support the main space where the giant edifice representing Athena Nike stands for the sole purpose of imposing her presence on those who occupy the space. The statue's presence informs the visitor of the goddesses' infinite power which reveled to them their place in the social-political order; this model trickled down and was replicated in Athenian society. The Athenians knew the statue was a mimetic copy of Athena Nike and they took on her Ideal attributes, in the form of imitation. J. A. Philip explains that the citizens of Athens were compelled to imitate the

> divine not in the sense of achieving a partial or a deceptive semblance … but in the sense of becoming like, not merely as copy is to exemplar, but as exhibiting in ourselves some element which, in spite of differences of scale or state or place, makes us

in that respect identical instances. We can achieve this god-likeness only by unremitting and strenuous effort of intellect.[46]

In other words, to ward off the chaos and contingencies of the world, to establish order, and to have a society, it is imperative that the Athenians assume the attributes of the god Athena Nike. This transference works in architectural space because Athena Nike is only a representation; in reality she is absent. This brings us back to the Kantian notion of the emptied subject that can be filled with abstract and universal content. Representational thinking is based on the assumption that a concept, idea, or image occurring in one's mind is equal to an identity, analogy, opposition, or resemblance to something in the world. The problem, Gilles Deleuze warns, is that representational thinking is not an immediate transfer of meaning but instead an oppressive form of mediation.[47] I believe that this model of making an idealized subject that represents abstract ideas concerning social-political behavior is prevalent today. The process *presupposes* the essence which an occupant must assume by some outside entity that judges them against an Ideal entity whose presence is revealed in architectural space. The issue concerns the difference between thinking spatially and non-spatially and how this might change one's approach to designing architecture.

THINKING SPATIALLY- THINKING NON-SPATIALLY

The cornerstone of the ideological apparatus relies on the conception that an individual is split between a sensual body and an intelligent essence—the essence is typically defined as an immortal soul containing our reason and intellect.[48] The essence contains who we are and remains the same throughout time, despite the fact that our bodies age. The mind-body dualism is a unique identity in that at any given moment it can be located in both space and time. The basis of this is representational thinking which means that an idea (in your mind) has an object or thing in space that it corresponds to through identification or resemblance. From the previous discussion we know that representations are easily co-opted and manipulated, into "being true" by those in power. This is the form of spatialized thinking where time is divided into discreet moments that contain a representation of our identity. It is a simple leap to connect this spatial-identity model to the typical architectural process. Architectural

space is traditionally designed as an aggregate of parts collected into a whole "within which everything can be either spatially or chronologically related with respect to everything else."[49] Within these spaces the traditional subject "orients herself with respect to [these] conventional notions of space and time."[50] One freely occupies space as a series of unfolding (temporal) and determined (spatial) locations as long as they match the predetermined, complete, and self-identical identities provided by the ideological system and implemented during the design process. Subsequently, ideological representations, such as banker, homeowner, museum goer, are freely assumed by the patrons. They recognize themselves in the "hail" of these ideological names.

On the contrary, Deleuze explains that "being is not made up of presents" and recounts Henri Bergson, who wrote, "the present is useful; [but] being is the past."[51]This replaces the model outlined above where we think of ourselves as always being present with the notion that the present is actually a moving target that we never fully occupy but use quite heavily. If there is no stable and singular present to occupy than there is no identity waiting for us at every moment of our lives. In other words, when we stop spatializing time into discreet instants we see the present as a continual becoming.[52] Further, if being, which is tantamount to saying essence or identity, is created in the past which makes it into a representation then it is an easy matter to employ it by those in power.

The present is revealed to be a living present which, according to Deleuze, has a limited duration because at any given moment being is exposed to different forces that potentially change it.[53] Their current moment is not a single inhabitable present or space that is identical with time itself because this would mean that we are frozen in time. This recognition breaks the idea of an enduring present inhabiting spatialized time. It destroys the fetishized manner—using abstracted identities, such as banker or homeowner— in which we imagine ourselves as essentially unchanging beings. Now there are any number of presents that can be formed, exhausted, and passed away that vary according to circumstances and not rules.

The consequences of this reversal reveals that architects can stop from erroneously designing space for a subject who is in the present and start designing for the multitude of presents which a person is occupying. Remember, that one's ontological status is established in the past when it is fixed by ideological processes. This is true because in order to think about someone or something requires a mental image or representation, but this image is already established by a representational process in the past which automatically resorts to a process of identity, analogy, resemblance, or opposition to determine the best "subjectivity" for the imagined person. The Deleuzian reversal requires one to think of being in terms of time and not space. To think of someone in terms of time means to see them as continually becoming and space is no longer an a priori container that contains us. If we no longer have a way to think of parcellized space then we should no longer have a way to think abstractly about people.

If architects abandon the use of abstract ideological identities (such as museum patron, resident, student, parishioner, etc.), in addition to abandoning spatialized time, then they would effectively block the route through which ideological power transfers its hold. In doing so, architects would embrace non-spatial thinking. Is this not what Deleuze meant when he wrote, "to think [freely] requires moving beyond formations of knowledge and dispersed visibilities to the 'no-place' from which 'what we see' and 'what we say' emerge?"[54] The phrases "formations of knowledge" and "dispersed visibilities" are code-phrases for the model of "thinking spatially" that uses measured deterministic spaces to effectively halt the vitality of an individual. Contrary, to embrace non-spatial thinking means to occupy the "no-place" which means that architects would create moments of probabilistic spaces and temporalities that nurture individual becoming in a state of continual *displacement*. What is at stake is to avoid the inclination to equate *agency* within the world with our ability to represent the world as always the same. Claire Colebrook explains that

> we see ourselves as subjected to the signifier, as inhabiting a law or system of relations imposed by an Other who does not exist … There is, if you like a space of white Oedipal man, a space that has expressed itself in a pure geometry, a geometry oriented by the sense of a space that would be the law for anybody whatever.[55]

This manner of thinking sees humanity from the outside residing in space that reduces life to a sequence of representations organizing and presenting a totalized point of view occurring within *spatialized time*. Deleuze argues that we should look intensively to find the dynamic true nature of life, which is the continually varying intensity of an individual becoming in *temporalized space*.[56]

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the notion of think non-spatially should be seen as a vehicle to make architectural space capable of breaking away from the ontological mandates imposed by those with power. We learned from Deleuze that when we think spatially we reduce life to limits, frozen moments, and oppressive determinations. These "rational divisions" form a system or paradigm exemplified by the Parthenon and the absent presence of Athena Nike that seeps into the walls, floors, and materials and ultimately into the lived spaces where those in power transform us into a predetermined political agent (or subject). On the other hand, to think non-spatially means to recognize the *right now* as being comprised of an immediate past and instantaneous future that is continually transforming us. The new sense of time-space allows the walls and voids, the inside and outside, our mind and body, the structure and form, in short architecture, to coalesce into a logic of space that responds to the dynamics of an individual and not the state. Architects should strive to design architecture composed of variations of any-geometry-whatsoever, multiple durations, and different non-chronological temporal moments. Our goal as architects should be to embrace the expression "of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of qualitative differentiation, of difference in degree."[57] Our intent is to stop using what I have been describing the paradigm of the absent presence of an Ideal(ized) subject.

ENDNOTES

1. Georges Bataille, "Architecture," in *Rethinking Architecture*, Neil Leach, reprint, 1929 (London: Routledge, 1998), 21.
2. Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Habberjam Barabara (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 104–6.
3. Kim Dovey, *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form* (London: Routledge, 1999), 194.
4. Ibid., 1.
5. The OED defines dimiurge as "A name for the Maker or Creator of the world, in the Platonic Philosophy; in certain later systems, as the Gnostic, conceived as a being subordinate to the Supreme Being, and sometimes as the author of evil."
6. Dovey, *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form*, 194.
7. Simon Richards, *Le Corbusier and the Concept of Self* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 198.
8. Ibid.
9. Thomas A. Markus, *Buildings and Power: Freedom and Control in the Origin of Modern Building Types* (London: Routledge, 1993), 318.
10. Ibid., xi.
11. Lisa Findley, *Building Change: Architecture, Politics and Cultural Agency* (London: Routledge, 2005), 210.
12. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Smith-Nicholson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 8.
13. Ibid., 16–19.
14. Ibid., 17–18.
15. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. N. I. Stone (New York: The International Library Pub. Co,), 11.
16. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 289.
17. Dovey, *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form*, 40–41.
18. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 182.
19. Ibid., 195.
20. Ibid., 201.
21. See for example, Best, Steven, and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory* (New York: Guilford Press, 1992); Roland Barthes, *Elements of Semiology* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967); Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*. trans. H. Zohn (London: Fontana, 1992); Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Foucault, Michel, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
22. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 98.
23. Slavoj Žižek's, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 45.
24. Slavoj Žižek's, *For They Know not What They Do* (London: Verso, 1991), 229.
25. Ibid., 230.
26. Ibid., 204.
27. Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 117–18.
28. Ibid., 109–10.
29. Ibid., 119.
30. Richard A. Etlin, "Le Corbusier, Choisy, and French Hellenism: The Nearch for a New Architecture," *The Art Bulletin* 69, no. 2 (June 1987): 268.
31. Ibid., 269.
32. Ibid., 272.
33. Ibid., 273–75.
34. Louis Kahn, *What Has Been Has Always Been: The Words of Louis I. Kahn*, ed. Richard Saul Wurman (New York: Rizzoli, 1986), 20.
35. Ibid.
36. Quoted by C. A. Poole in "Theoretical and Poetical Ideas in Le Corbusier's *Une Maison - un Palais*." The Journal of Architecture 3 (Spring 1998): 26.
37. Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture*, Frederick Etchells, reprint, 1931 (New York: Dover Publications, 1986), 140–41.
38. Richards, *Le Corbusier and the Concept of Self*, 11.
39. Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture*, 133.
40. Quoted from *Un Maison- Une Palais* by C. A. Poole in "Theoretical and Poetical Ideas in Le Corbusier's *Une Maison - un Palais*." The Journal of Architecture 3 (Spring 1998): 6.

41. Richards, *Le Corbusier and the Concept of Self*, 197.

42. Ibid., 202.

43. Sophia Psarra, "The Parthenon and the Erechtheion: The Architectural Formation of Place, Politics and Myth," *The Journal of Architecture* 9 (Spring 2004): 80.

44. Ibid., 82.

45. Ibid., 85.

46. J. A. Philip, "Mimesis in the Sophistes of Plato," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 92 (1961): 467.

47. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton, reprint, 1968 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 28–30.

48. For the foundations of the argument see: Plato, *Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus* (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, 1999) and Descartes, R. *The Philosophical Writings of René Descartes*, trans. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, vol. 2).

49. Tamsin Lorraine, "Ahab and Becoming -Whale: The Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space," in *Deleuze an Space*, ed. Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 159.

50. Tamsin Lorraine, "Ahab and Becoming-Whale: The Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space," ed. Ian Buchana and Gregg Lambert (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 159.

51. Gilles Deleuze, "Bergson, 1959–1941," in *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Christopher Bush, reprint, 1956 (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 24.

52. Deleuze, *DR*, 80–85.

53. Ibid., 76–77.

54. Deleuze. Gilles, *Foucault*, trans. Sean. Hand (London: Athlone, 1988), 38.

55. Claire Colebrook, "The Space of Man: On the Specificity of Affect in Deleuze and Guattari," in *Deleuze and Space*, ed. Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 199.

56. Deleuze, *DR*, 50–53.

57. Deleuze, *DR*, 38.